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Abstract Brams’ paradox of new members and Shenoy’s paradox of smaller coali-
tions are, in a sense, equivalent. They are both implied by the monotonicity of a power
index: while the first is exhibited on every simple game that is not strong, the latter
can be observed on every simple game in which players are not almost symmetric.
For the Shapley–Shubik index, this symmetry condition is not only necessary but also
sufficient to avoid the paradox of smaller coalitions.
Keywords Paradox of smaller coalitions · Paradox of new members · Monotonic
power indices
1 Introduction
The problem of measuring power in simple games appeared to be solved after the
discoveries of the Shapley–Shubik index (Shapley 1953; Shapley and Shubik 1954)
and the Banzhaf–Coleman index (Banzhaf 1965; Coleman 1971). Of course, these
are not the only power measures (see for instance Fara et al 2014, for more on power
measures), but they can be considered as the most important ones. However, both
indices, when applied to games with different player sets, have properties that are not
intuitive. These issues were first described by Brams (1975) and Brams and Affuso
(1976) who showed, using the extension of the EU Council in 1973, that adding new
players to a game might increase the power of some old players. Brams (1975) called
this discovery the paradox of new members.
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Shenoy (1979) derived a similar result when applying power indices not only to
the grand coalition but to each of its subcoalitions. Intuitively, players should have
more power in smaller coalitions. However, it turned out that in some games there
are smaller coalitions in which some players are worse off than in the original larger
coalition. In this case, a power index would exhibit the paradox of smaller coalitions.
The latter paradox played a crucial role in the theory of coalition formation in simple
games. Shenoy (1979) showed that if a power index does not exhibit the paradox of
smaller coalitions on a simple game, then there is a minimal winning coalition which
is core stable—that is, which will not be left by any group of players. Dimitrov and
Haake (2008) relaxed this condition and showed that it is sufficient that any coalition
has at least one subcoalition inwhich each player is not worse off. This seems like a fair
generalization of Shenoy’s result; however, I will show that in the case of monotonic
power indices, it is still quite restricting.
The initial work of Brams and Affuso (1976) derived results on how likely the
paradox is to appear. I follow a different approach and investigate the connection
between the paradox and the monotonicity of a power index. The relevant definitions
can be found in Sect. 2; I also show there that the paradoxes of Shenoy and Brams are,
in a sense, equivalent. Two versions of the paradox of new members are investigated
in Sect. 3. In particular, it is shown that they are exhibited by any monotonic power
index on (almost) every simple game that can be extended. The two versions of the
paradox of smaller coalitions are under consideration in Sect. 4, where I show that
they are exhibited if players are not almost symmetrical. The condition derived there
is both sufficient and necessary for the Shapley–Shubik index. I close the article by
briefly discussing the consequences of the incompatibility of monotonicity and the
paradoxes’ not being exhibited.
2 Four paradoxes and an axiom
2.1 Preliminaries
Let  be a universe of players, and let P f () be the collection of finite subsets of
, called coalitions.1 Throughout the paper, when I talk about a player set N , N is
finite. A simple game is a function v : P f () → {0, 1} with v (∅) = 0, such that
v (S) ≤ v (T ) for all S, T ∈ P f with S ⊆ T , and v (S) + v (T ) ≤ 1 for any two
disjoint coalitions S, T ; the latter property is called properness. If v(S) = 0 for all
coalitions S, v is called the zero game.
A coalition S with v (S) = 1 is called winning. Let S be winning. If v (S) −
v (S\ {i}) = 1 then i is called pivotal (in S with respect to v). If S is such that
each i ∈ S is pivotal, S is called minimal winning. The set of minimal winning
coalitions is denoted by M (v). The carrier c (v) of a simple game v is defined as
c (v) = ⋃S∈M(v) S. Throughout the paper, I consider games with finite carrier. If|M (v) | = 1, then v is called unanimous. If v (S) − v (S\ {i}) = 1 for all winning
1 The reason why I introduce a universe of players instead of working on a fixed player set N lies in the
nature of the problem: I am interested in the effects on power indices if the player set is changed.
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coalitions S then i is called a veto player (with respect to v). If i /∈ c (v), then i is
called a null player with respect to v.2 For a coalition S, the subgame vS is defined as
vS (T ) = v (S ∩ T ) for all coalitions T . In particular, c (vS) ⊆ S.
A power index ϕ maps a simple game v and player set N with c(v) ⊆ N into RN .
A power index ϕ satisfies the null player axiom if ϕi (v, N ) = 0 for all i /∈ c(v). I will
use the null player axiom only for a few remarks, it will not be necessary for the main
results. In particular, I will formulate all paradoxes and theorems for arbitrary player
sets that include the carrier of the respective game.
2.2 New members and smaller coalitions
In Brams (1975), the author derives several fundamental properties, a power index
should satisfy. One of them is the property of new members. Let v be a simple game.
An extension of v is a simple game u such that M(v) ⊆ M(u) and c(v)  c(u). A
simple game v is extendable if there is an extension u of v. Expecting that the addition
of new players to a game would not make old players more powerful, Brams (1975)
formulated the following paradox.
Strong paradox of new members A power index ϕ exhibits the strong paradox of
new members on a simple game v if there is an
extension u of v and a player i ∈ c(v) such that
ϕi (u, N ) > ϕi (v, N ) for all player sets N with
c(u) ⊆ N .
The definition of an extension is quite strict (in Lemma 1, the set of extendable
simple games is characterized), and does not capture a very prominent historical case
of an extension of a council: namely, the extension of the EU Council of Ministers in
1973 (see Table 1) that has been analyzed by Brams and Affuso (1976). It can easily
be seen that some coalitions (for instance, France, Germany and Italy) had a majority
before but not after 1973. Aweak extension of a simple game v is a simple game u such
that c(v)  c(u) and v(S) ≥ uc(v)(S) for all coalitions S. This means that instead
of only adding new winning coalitions, old winning coalitions might be removed.
Clearly, every non-trivial extension is a weak extension with v(S) = uc(v)(S).
Weak paradox of new members A power index ϕ exhibits the weak paradox of
new members on a simple game v if there is a
weak extension u of v and a player i ∈ c(v) such
that ϕi (u, N ) > ϕi (v, N ) for all player sets N
with c(u) ⊆ N .
As every extension of a game is also a weak extension, the paradox of newmembers
indeed implies its weak version. Note that a weak extension of a game can easily be
obtained by keeping the votes of old players constant, adding new players with votes,
and increasing the quota that is necessary for a coalition to be winning (see, for
instance, the extension of the EU Council in 1979 in Table 1).
2 Equivalently, i is a null player if v(S) = v (S\ {i}) for each coalition S.
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Table 1 Votes and quotas in the EU Council before the Treaty of Nice
Country 1957a 1973b 1979c 1985d 1995e
France 4 10 10 10 10
Germany 4 10 10 10 10
Italy 4 10 10 10 10
UK – 10 10 10 10
Spain – – – 8 8
Belgium 2 5 5 5 5
The Netherlands 2 5 5 5 5
Greece – – 5 5 5
Portugal – – – 5 5
Sweden – – – – 4
Austria – – – – 4
Denmark – 3 3 3 3
Ireland – 3 3 3 3
Finland – – – – 3
Luxembourg 1 2 2 2 2
Total 17 58 63 76 87
Quota 12 41 45 54 62
a Art. 148, Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty, “Treaty of Rome”)
b Art. 8, Council Decision of the European Communities of 1 January 1973 adjusting the documents
concerning the accession of new member States to the Euopean Communities
c Art. 14, Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Hellenic Republic and the adjustments to the
Treaties
d Art. 14, Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic
and the adjustments to the Treaties
e Art. 8, Decision of the Council of the European Union of 1 January 1995 adjusting the instruments
concerning the accession of new Member States to the European Union
A similar paradox in a different framework appeared in Shenoy (1979). The author
was not interested in the extension of games by new players. Rather, he applied power
indices on games and subgames. In the expectation that players would be more pow-
erful in smaller coalitions, he formulated the following paradox.
Weak paradox of smaller coalitions A power index ϕ exhibits the weak paradox of
smaller coalitions on a simple game v if there are
winning3 coalitions S, T ⊆ c(v), T ⊆ S, and
i ∈ c (vT ) such that ϕi (vS, N ) > ϕi (vT , N ) for
all player sets N with c(vS) ⊆ N .
Originally, this paradox was not called weak; however, given more recent devel-
opments, this name seems appropriate. Dimitrov and Haake (2008) commented on
this paradox as it plays a role when looking for stable coalitions. They introduced a
3 If S is not winning then vS is the zero game and power in vS is not very interesting.
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weaker condition on a power index and a simple game by requiring that the following
stronger paradox is not exhibited.
Strong paradox of smaller coalitions A power index ϕ exhibits the strong paradox of
smaller coalitions on a simple game v if there
is a winning coalition S ⊆ c(v) such that for
all T ⊆ S there is i ∈ c (vT ) with ϕi (vS, N ) >
ϕi (vT , N ) for all player sets N with c(vS) ⊆ N .
Hence, if each (non-minimal) winning coalition has at least one winning sub-
coalition where each member gets at least the same payoff, a power index does not
exhibit this stronger paradox. The following easy observation closes this subsection.
Proposition 1 A power index ϕ exhibits the strong paradox of new members on a
simple game v if and only if there is a simple game u such that ϕ exhibits the weak
paradox of smaller coalitions on u.
Proof Let ϕ exhibit the weak paradox of smaller coalitions on the simple game u.
Then, there are winning coalitions S, T ⊆ c(u) and a player i ∈ c (uT ) such that
T ⊆ S and ϕi (uS, N ) > ϕi (uT , N ) for all player sets N with c(uS) ⊆ N . As uS is
an extension of uT , the strong paradox of new members follows.
On the other hand, if ϕ exhibits the strong paradox of new members on v, there
are an extension u of v and a player i ∈ c(v) such that ϕi (u, N ) > ϕi (v, N ) for all
player sets N with c(u) ⊆ N . As v = uc(v), the weak paradox of smaller coalitions
follows. 	unionsq
2.3 Monotonic power indices
In the next two sections, I show that the following axiom,which is satisfied for instance
by the Shapley–Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik 1954) and the Banzhaf–Coleman
index (Banzhaf 1965; Coleman 1971), is responsible for the paradoxes.4
Monotonicity A power index ϕ is called monotonic5 if for all simple games u, v and
all N where c(u) ∪ c(v) ⊆ N it holds that ϕi (v, N ) > ϕi (u, N ) for
all i ∈ N such that
v (S) − v (S\ {i}) ≥ u (S) − u (S\ {i}) for all S ⊆ N ,
and v (S) − v (S\ {i}) > u (S) − u (S\ {i}) for some S ⊆ N .
It can easily be seen that if i is a null player in u but not in v then monotonicity
implies that i has strictly greater power in v than in u; in particular, if the null player
axiom is, additionally, satisfied then i’s power in v is strictly positive.
4 Kóczy (2009) shows that the null player axiom, together with a normalization, implies the strong paradox
of new players for all simple games. This is not true here as null players are excluded from the set of players
that can profit from an extension. In that sense, the paradox here is stronger than the one in Kóczy (2009).
5 Note that this definition is the one introduced in Sagonti (1991) and is slightly different from the definition
given in Young (1985) to characterize the Shapley value.
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3 The paradox of new members
Before any results on the exhibition of the strong paradox of new players are derived,
I shall answer the question: what games are extendable at all? To formulate the
next lemma, I need the following definition. A simple game v is called strong if
v (S) + v (c(v)\S) = 1 for all S ⊆ c(v). That means, it is not only required that the
complement of a winning coalition [in c(v)] is losing, but also that the complement
of a losing coalition [in c(v)] is winning.
Lemma 1 A simple game v is extendable if and only if it is not strong.
Proof Let v be a strong game. Then, there are exactly 2|c(v)|−1 winning coalitions
contained in c(v). Suppose there is an extension u of v. Then, v has exactly 2|c(u)|−1
winning coalitions that are contained in c(u). As u is an extension of v, it must have at
least 2|c(u)|−1 +1 winning coalitions in c(u). Hence, u cannot be proper, i.e., it cannot
be an extension of v.
On the other hand, let v not be strong. Then, there is a nonempty coalition S such
that v (S) = v (c(v)\S) = 0. Let k /∈ c(v) and u be the (unique) simple game with
minimal winning coalitions M (v) ∪ {S ∪ {k}}. Then, u is a non-trivial extension of
v. 	unionsq
The good news is that extendable games can easily be identified. From a theoretical
perspective, these games can now easily be handled and much is already known about
them. The following theorem, however, shows that if a simple game is extendable then
any monotonic power index exhibits the strong paradox of new members on it.
Theorem 1 Let ϕ be a monotonic power index. Then, ϕ does not exhibit the strong
paradox of new members on a simple game v if and only if v is strong.
Proof If v is strong, it is not extendable and thus ϕ cannot exhibit the paradox. So,
let v not be strong. Then, there is a nonempty coalition S ⊆ c(v) such that v (S) =
v (c(v)\S) = 0. Let k /∈ c(v) and let u be the simple game with minimal winning
coalitions M (v) ∪ {S ∪ {k}}. Obviously, c(u) = c(v) ∪ {k}. Let N be a player set
containing c(u), let i ∈ S, and let T ⊆ N . Suppose that T is such that i is pivotal in T
with respect to v. As k /∈ c(v), this means that i is also pivotal in T \ {k} with respect
to v. In particular, u (T ) ≥ u (T \ {k}) = v (T \ {k}) = 1. Further, the only minimal
winning coalition with respect to u that contains k is S ∪ {k}, and therefore it contains
i as well. This means that k cannot be pivotal (with respect to u) in any coalition that
does not contain i . Hence, u (T \ {i}) = u (T \ {i, k}) = v (T \ {i, k}) = 0. Therefore,
u (T ) − u (T \ {i}) ≥ v (T ) − v (T \ {i}) (1)
for all T ⊆ N in which i is pivotal with respect to v. If T is such that i is not pivotal
in T with respect to v, then v (T ) − v (T \ {i}) = 0 and Eq. (1) holds as well. Further,
u (S ∪ {k}) − u ((S ∪ {k}) \ {i}) = 1 > 0 = v (S ∪ {k}) − v ((S ∪ {k}) \ {i})
as v (S ∪ {k}) = 0. Hence, by monotonicity, ϕi (u, N ) > ϕi (v, N ). 	unionsq
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The following corollary is an easy consequence of the foregoing proof. It states that
for every simple game v that is not strong and for every player, whether or not he is
a null player with respect to v, an extension of v can be found that makes this player
better off.
Corollary 1 Let ϕ be a monotonic power index and let v be a simple game that is
not strong. Then, for each i ∈ , there is an extension u of v such that ϕi (u, N ) >
ϕi (v, N ) for each N with c(u) ∪ {i} ⊆ N.
Proof Let v be a simple game that is not strong. If i ∈ c(v), there is S ⊆ c(v) such that
v(S) = v(c(v)\S) = 0 and i ∈ S. Using the construction in the proof of Theorem 1, an
extension u of v can be obtained with ϕi (u, N ) > ϕi (v, N ) for all N with c(v) ⊆ N .
If i /∈ c(v), there is S ⊆ c(v) such that v(S) = v(c(v)\S) = 0. Let u be the simple
game with minimal winning coalitions {S ∪ {i}} ∪ M(v). Then, by monotonicity,
ϕi (u, N ) > ϕi (v, N ) for each N with c(u) ∪ {i} ⊆ N , as i is not pivotal in any
coalition with respect to v but is pivotal in S ∪ {i} with respect to u.
The remainder of this section will deal with weak extensions. Note that every game
can be weakly extended; I have already mentioned how it can be done for weighted
voting games in Sect. 2. And, again, monotonicity will imply the paradox on almost
all games. A dictatorship is a simple game v with c(v) = {i} for a player i ∈ . In
such a game, a decision can be made by i only, independently of the player set that v is
applied to. Note that if there is a veto player in a strong game v then v is a dictatorship.
Theorem 2 Let ϕ be a monotonic power index. Then, ϕ exhibits the weak paradox of
new members on all simple games that are not dictatorships.
Proof Let v be a game that is not a dictatorship and let N ′ be a player set with
c(v) ⊆ N ′. I first show that there exist a game v′ and a player i ∈ c(v′) such that
v′ is not strong, v′(S) ≤ v(S) for all coalitions S, and ϕi (v, N ′) ≤ ϕi (v′, N ′). If v
is not strong, choose v′ = v. If v is strong, there is i ∈ c(v) that is not contained in
all minimal winning coalitions (otherwise, v would be a dictatorship). Let S ∈ M(v)
such that i /∈ S and let v′ be the simple game that is defined by
v′(T ) =
{
v(T ), if T = S
0, if T = S.
Then, v′(T ) − v′(T \{i}) ≥ v(T ) − v(T \{i}) for all T ⊆ N ′ and
v′(S ∪ {i}) − v′(S) = v(S ∪ {i}) − 0 = 1 > v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S).
Hence, ϕi (v, N ′) < ϕi (v′, N ′) by monotonicity of ϕ.
By Corollary 1, there is an extension u of v′ such that ϕi (u, N ) > ϕi (v′, N ) ≥
ϕi (v, N ) for all N with c(u) ⊆ N . Since, in particular, u is a weak extension of v, the
claim is proved. 	unionsq
The following corollary is now clear and the proof is omitted.
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Corollary 2 Let ϕ be a monotonic power index and let v be a simple game which is
not a dictatorship. Then, for each i ∈ , there is a weak extension u of v such that
ϕi (u, N ) > ϕi (v, N ) for each N with c(u) ⊆ N.
4 The paradox of smaller coalitions
The strong paradox of new members and the weak paradox of smaller coalitions are
equivalent in the sense that if one is exhibited by a power index on an arbitrary simple
game then there is another game on which the other one is exhibited. Nonetheless,
they are not exhibited on the same set of games. In the next subsection, a condition on
simple games is derived that is necessary for the non-exhibition of the strong paradox
of smaller coalitions by a monotonic power index. In Sect. 4.2, I will show that this
condition is also sufficient in case of the Shapley–Shubik index.
4.1 Avoiding the paradox of smaller coalitions
The key problem of monotonic power indices is that veto players have more power
in larger coalitions than in smaller ones. The next lemma illustrates this observation.
Recall that M(v) is the collection of minimal winning coalitions with respect to v.
For a player i , let Mi (v) be the collection of those minimal winning coalitions that
contain i . Clearly, Mi (v) = ∅ if and only if i ∈ c(v).
Lemma 2 Let ϕ be a monotonic power index and let v be a simple game such that ϕ
does not exhibit the strong paradox of smaller coalitions on v. Then, for each winning
coalition S, either vS is an unanimous game or there is no veto player with respect to
vS.
Proof Let S be a winning coalition with players i, j ∈ S such that i is pivotal in
S and j is neither null player nor pivotal. Let N be a player set with c (vS) ⊆ N
and let T ⊆ N be such that vS\{ j}(T ) − vS\{ j}(T \{i}) = 1. Then, vS(T ) = 1 and
vS(T \{i}) ≤ v(S\{i}) = 0. On the other hand, let T ⊆ N such that T ∈ M j (vS).
(Such a T exists as j is not a null player in S.) Then, i is pivotal in T with respect
to vS but vS\{ j} (T ) = vS (T \{ j}) = 0. Hence, ϕi (vS, N ) > ϕi
(
vS\{ j}, N
)
by strong
monotonicity—that is, ϕ exhibits the strong paradox of smaller coalitions on v. 	unionsq
Lemma 2 reveals that a monotonic power index will exhibit the paradox on a
number of simple games. This has been elaborated for instance in Karos (2014). The
next theorem characterizes the class of simple games that have the property described
in Lemma 2.
Theorem 3 Let v be a simple game. Then, v satisfies the necessary condition of
Lemma 2 if and only if |M j (vS) | = |Mk (vS) | for all winning coalitions S ⊆ c(v)
and all j, k ∈ c (vS).
Proof First, let |Mi (vS) | = |M j (vS) | for all winning coalitions S and all i, j ∈
c (vS). Let T be a winning coalition. If Mi (vT ) = M (vT ) for all i ∈ c (vT ), then
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vT is unanimous. If |Mi (vT ) | < |M (vT ) | for all i ∈ c (vT ), then there are no veto
players with respect to vT . Hence, v satisfies the condition in Lemma 2.
Now, let v be a simple game such that for each winning coalition S, the game
vS is either unanimous or does not contain any veto players. The claim is proved by
induction on the cardinality of c(v), n. For n = 1 and n = 2, it is obviously true.
So, let v be such that n = 3. Then, v is either the three player unanimity game or the
symmetric game in which each coalition of at least two players is winning. In both
cases, the theorem is true.
Let now n ≥ 4. If v is the unanimous game, the claim is clearly true. So let v not
be unanimous. In this case, there cannot be any veto players with respect to v by our
initial condition. In particular, vc(v)\{i} is not the zero game for any i ∈ c (v). For a
player i ∈ c(v) let
Di = {l ∈ c(v)\{i : i /∈ c(vc(v)\{l})}
and
Ei = {l ∈ c(v) : i ∈ c(vc(v)\{l})}.
In words, Di contains all those players l that “help” i in the sense that after one of them
is removed from the game, i becomes a null player. The set Ei contains those players
l on whose presence i does not depend: If l is removed, i still has some (maybe less)
power. Note that c(v) can be partitioned into Di , Ei and {i}. In particular, Ei = ∅ as
otherwise c(v) ∈ Mi (v) in contradiction to v’s not being unanimous. I first show that
|M j (v) | = |Mk (v) | for all j, k ∈ c(v). Consider two cases.
1. Let k ∈ Dj . In this case M j (v) ⊆ Mk(v) or, equivalently, M(vc(v)\{k}) ⊆
M(vc(v)\{ j}). Iwill show that these two sets are equal. For this purpose, note the fol-
lowing observation. Let i ∈ E j and l ∈ Dj . Then, M j (vc(v)\{i}) ⊆ Ml(vc(v)\{i})
and the induction hypothesis delivers that |M j (vc(v)\{i})| = |Ml(vc(v)\{i})|.
Hence, M j (vc(v)\{i}) = Ml(vc(v)\{i}) for all i ∈ E j and all l ∈ Dj .
Assume now that M j (v)  Mk(v)—that is, there is a coalition S ∈
Mk(vc(v)\{ j}). Then, E j ⊆ S. For, if there were i ∈ E j\S, then S ∈
Mk(vc(v)\{i}) = M j (vc(v)\{i}) (as seen before), which would mean that S were a
minimal winning coalition containing j , in contradiction to S ∈ M(vc(v)\{ j}).
Recall that E j = ∅, let i ∈ E j , and letT ∈ M(vc(v)\{i}) (such aT exists, asvc(v)\{i}
is not the zero game). Suppose j /∈ T . Then, T /∈ M j (vc(v)\{i}) = Ml(vc(v)\{i})
for any l ∈ Dj . In particular, T ⊆ c(v)\(Dj ∪{i, j}) ⊆ E j\{i}  S, contradicting
the minimality of S. Hence, j ∈ T for all T ∈ M(vc(v)\{i}).
This means that vc(v)\{i, j} is the zero game and therefore, i is pivotal in vc(v)\{ j}.
By the initial condition, vc(v)\{ j} must be unanimous, and as S ∈ M(vc(v)\{ j}) it
must hold that {S} = M(vc(v)\{ j}) ⊇ M(vc(v)\{k}). Hence, as vc(v)\{k} is not the
zero game, {S} = M(vc(v)\{k}), in contradiction to S ∈ Mk(v). Hence, there is
no S ∈ Mk(vc(v)\{ j}) and therefore Mk(v) = M j (v).
2. Let k ∈ E j . I first show that there is i ∈ N such that |M j (vc(v)\{i})| =
|Mk(vc(v)\{i})|. By the induction hypothesis, it is sufficient to show that there
is i ∈ N such that either both j and k are null players in vc(v)\{i} or neither of them
is. Equivalently, either i ∈ Dj ∩ Dk or i /∈ Dj ∪ Dk .
Suppose that such i does not exist. In this case, c(v) = Dj ∪Dk and Dj ∩Dk = ∅.
From the first part of the proof, it follows that l ∈ Dj if and only if j ∈ Dl . In
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particular, each l ∈ Dj is a null player in vc(v)\{ j}. Hence, v(c(v)\(Dj ∪ { j})) =
v(c(v)\{ j}) = 1. But this means that v(Dk) = v(c(v)\Dj ) = 1 and for the
same reasons v(Dj ) = 1. Hence, as Dj and Dk are disjoint, v is not proper—a
contradiction.
Therefore, there must be i ∈ N such that |M j (vc(v)\{i})| = |Mk(vc(v)\{i})|. For
such i it holds that
|M(vc(v)\{ j})| = |M(vc(v)\{i, j})| + |M(vc(v)\{k, j})| − |M(vc(v)\{i,k, j})|
= |M(vc(v)\{i})| − |M j (vc(v)\{i})| + |M(vc(v)\{k, j})| − |M(vc(v)\{i,k, j})|
= |M(vc(v)\{i})| − |Mk(vc(v)\{i})| + |M(vc(v)\{k, j})| − |M(vc(v)\{i,k, j})|
= |M(vc(v)\{i,k})| + |M(vc(v)\{ j,k})| − |M(vc(v)\{i, j,k})|
= |M(vc(v)\{k})|.
Consequently,
|M j (v)| = |M(v)| − |M(vc(v)\{ j})|
= |M(v)| − |M(vc(v)\{k})|
= |Mk(v)|.
I have shown that |M j (v)| = |Mk(v)| for all j, k ∈ c(v). By the induction hypothesis
|M j (vS)| = |Mk(vS)| for all subsets S  c(v) and all j, k ∈ c(vS). 	unionsq
The condition on a simple game given in Theorem 3, namely that in every subgame
every non-null player is contained in the same number of minimal winning coalitions,
is quite strong; it is satisfied, for instance, by simple games in which all players are
symmetric. Nevertheless, the latter is not a necessary condition as can be seen in the
simple game with minimal winning coalitions {1, 2, 3}, {3, 4, 5}, and {1, 2, 4, 5}.
4.2 The Shapley–Shubik index
The Shapley–Shubik index (Shapley 1953; Shapley and Shubik 1954) is defined as
σ j (v, N ) =
∑
S⊆N , j∈S
(|N | − |S|)!(|S| − 1)!
|N |! (v(S) − v(S\{ j})).
It is well known that σ does not depend on N , I will therefore simply write σ(v)
for σ(v, N ). Also, σ is monotonic (Sagonti 1991) and therefore exhibits the strong
paradox of smaller coalitions on all games not satisfying the condition in Theorem 3.
But this condition is, in fact, both necessary and sufficient.
Corollary 3 Let v be a simple game. Then, the Shapley–Shubik index does not exhibit
the strong paradox of smaller coalitions on v if and only if |Mi (vS)| = |M j (vS)| for
all winning coalitions S and all i, j ∈ c(vS).
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Proof By be Lemma 2 and Theorem 3, it is necessary that |Mi (vS)| = |M j (vS)| for
all winning coalitions S and all i, j ∈ c(vS). To show that this is sufficient, I show
that σ j (v) ≤ maxT∈M j 1|T | for any such v. In this case, for any coalition S, a minimal
winning coalition T ⊆ S of minimal cardinality delivers higher power for each player
in T than S. The claim is shown by induction over n = |c(v)|. It is clearly true if
v is unanimous, in particular, it is true if n ≤ 2. Hence, let n ≥ 3 and let v not be
unanimous. Then, vc(v)\{k} is not the zero game for any k. Let T be a minimal winning
coalition of minimal cardinality and let j ∈ T . Then,
σ j (v) = 1|c(v)|
∑
k = j
σ j (vc(v)\{k}) ≤ |c(v)| − 1|c(v)|
1
|T | ≤
1
|T |
by the induction hypothesis. 	unionsq
5 Conclusion
I have shown that some natural properties one would expect from power indices
contradict each other on many simple games. Nevertheless, these two properties are
reasonable in different contexts: whilemonotonicity seems very natural for gameswith
the same carrier, non-exhibition of the paradox of new players (or smaller coalitions)
usually concerns games with different carriers.
There are authors arguing that the paradox of new members is not paradoxical
(Felsenthal and Machover 1995) on the grounds that the power of a player is a global
property that involves the whole structure of the game. Although this is clearly true,
it makes the (equivalent) paradox of smaller coalitions even more peculiar: a player
has less power in a smaller coalition despite the fact that this coalition is part of the
same game and the only difference is that (other) players are left out.
It therefore seems that monotonic power indices (including the Shapley index and
the Banzhaf index) are not the right instrument to measure power in a council or
parliament where the formation of coalitions is likely. It rather makes a case for power
measures that take into account players’ options both within and outside coalitions,
such as the bargaining set (Davis and Maschler 1963), or more recently a class of
solutions investigated in Karos (2013) where players’ power is based on bargaining
solutions.
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